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THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION’S BID TO TRANSFORM
INTERNATIONAL LAW
David Ward*

Abstract
This Comment has two principle aims. First, it will argue that the
core doctrines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) rest on
a problematic legal basis; specifically, that these doctrines contradict
well-established human rights norms that SCO members themselves
endorsed by treaty. Such norms include non-refoulement (which
prohibits the return of refugees to countries where their life or freedom
would be threatened), prohibitions against torture and genocide, and the
universally accepted right to self-determination with its attendant
political, religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural freedoms.
Second, through case studies, this Comment will illustrate the
practical results of these SCO doctrines as applied by SCO members.
The Comment suggests that the continued application of these doctrines,
combined with SCO’s imminent expansion, will transform international
and human rights law into a more authoritarian-friendly regime marked
less by the rule of law than by the will of state leaders.
The remainder of this Comment is organized as follows. Part I uses
the 2005 Andijan Massacre as a case study to introduce the way in which
SCO members rely on SCO doctrines and obligations to override
fundamental international laws. This case provides a context to
understand the practical implications and consequences of the legal
doctrines that are analyzed in detail in Part III. Part II presents a brief
overview of SCO’s background, including its primary objective, origins
and impetus, and imminent expansion. Part III analyzes the problematic
legal basis of SCO’s core doctrines, including the “Three Evils”
doctrine, the “Concept of Cooperation,” its secretive blacklist and
information-sharing practices, and the principle of “non-interference in
internal affairs.” Part IV moves beyond theory to illustrate through three
case studies the actual ways in which SCO’s core doctrines come into
conflict with its members’ international legal obligations. Between the
three case studies in Part IV and the one in Part I, all six SCO members
are included, giving a representative view of the application and impact
of SCO’s core doctrines and policies. Part V states a brief conclusion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The 2005 Andijan Massacre
In the early morning of May 13, 2005, a band of unidentified men
rushed the Andijan Prison in Uzbekistan, freeing twenty-three local
businessmen who were awaiting the verdict of their three-month trial for
“extremism, fundamentalism, and separatism.”1 As word of the jailbreak
spread, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people gathered in Andijan’s
Babur Square to air grievances ranging from unemployment to the
injustice of the businessmen’s trial. 2 Uzbek security forces clamped
down, and by the end of the next day, approximately 300 to 500 people
had been killed.3
Uzbek forces arrested and tortured hundreds, 4 but roughly 500
people made it thirty kilometers to the Karadarya River where they
crossed into Kyrgyzstan as refugees. 5 Under international law, those
refugees had a right to asylum.6 In addition, Kyrgyzstan’s own law on
refugees expressly prohibits refoulement.7 Furthermore, UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan specifically asked Kyrgyzstan not to repatriate
Uzbeks seeking asylum, stating, “The principle of non-refoulement . . . is
absolute and may not be derogated or circumvented through any other
undertaking, be that bilateral treaty or any other arrangement.”8
However, as members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had just signed the 2005 Astana
Declaration, which requires SCO members to not only deny asylum to,

1
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE [OSCE], PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE EVENTS IN
ANDIJAN, UZBEKISTAN, 13 MAY 2005 6 (2005) [hereinafter OSCE ANDIJAN REPORT].
2
Id.
3
Id. at 8.
4
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), KAZAKHSTAN/KYRGYZSTAN:
EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS, PROTECTION DENIED TO ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES
64 (2009) [hereinafter FIDH].
5
OSCE ANDIJAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
6
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Dec. 16, 1966, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter Refugee Convention] (stating “no Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion”); see also Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention against
Torture] (stating “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture”).
7
Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on refugees, art. 11 (2002), available at
www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4957 (“A person, having received a denial of granting refugee
status in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, or a notice on the revocation of refugee status shall
not, under any circumstances, be expelled to the country, where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, ethnic origin, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion or a country, where he might become a victim of torture or a subject
to an inhuman treatment.”).
8
Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Calls on Kyrgyzstan Authorities to
Facilitate Evacuation of Uzbek Refugees, UN Press Release SG/SM/10020-Ref/1184 (July 28,
2005).
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but also extradite, those suspected of terrorism, extremism, or
separatism.9
Faced with the choice of either violating the principle of nonrefoulement, which some experts consider to be jus cogens,10 or ignoring
the 2005 Astana Declaration and its SCO treaty obligations, Kyrgyzstan
chose the former and sent five refugees back to Uzbekistan.11
Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy General Prosecutor, Sumar Nasiza,
acknowledged the difficulty of the decision, stating, “For these five
Uzbeks I didn’t sleep for three nights: on the one hand there is the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, on the other hand there is the
Convention Against Torture.”12 He justified his decision to extradite,
saying Uzbekistan had asked for the return of 129 refugees, and that the
five who were extradited were criminals. 13 Nasiza did not mention
Kyrgyszstan’s own law against refoulement or its treaty obligations
under both the Convention against Torture and the Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees. Ultimately, he trusted in Uzbek guarantees that
the refugees would not be tortured upon their return.14 They are all in
prison, “alive and kicking,” he said. 15 “We haven’t lost any of them.”16
Kyrgyzstan’s Vice-speaker of Parliament offered a different
perspective: “[T]hose who fled Uzbekistan were begging that we didn’t
give them back, because they would be tortured.”17 While it is unclear if
those five individuals have been tortured, it is well-documented that
Uzbekistan engages in torture and “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,” all of which violate the Convention against
Torture.18 As such, Kyrgyzstan’s deportation, which its SCO obligations
not only made possible but required, was a blatant violation of the wellestablished international law of non-refoulement.
II. SCO BACKGROUND
A. The Goal of a New International Order
Kyrgyzstan’s refoulement of five Uzbek nationals following the
2005 Andijan Massacre may seem to be a minor incident. However, it
exemplifies how SCO’s policies and practices subvert and even supplant

9
Declaration by the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (June 5, 2005),
available
at
http://kazakhstanun.org/documents/undocuments/SCO%20Declaration%20(Eng%2019.07.05).doc.
10
See, e.g., U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (January 26, 2007); see also Jean Allain, The Jus
Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533 (2001).
11
FIDH, supra note 4, at 63.
12
Id. at 74.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UZBEKISTAN 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 3–5 (2013).
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many of the conventions, customary laws, general principles, and expert
opinions that constitute international law.19
As the organization expands and matures, its treaty obligations,
practices, and values will increasingly constitute the new norm. This is a
primary objective of SCO, as stated in Article 1 of its charter: “The main
goals and tasks of SCO are: . . . promotion of a new democratic, fair and
rational political and economic international order.”20
In the words of Russian president Vladimir Putin, “With our
combined efforts we will be able to bring the work of Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation to a whole new level and achieve the
ambitious goal of transforming our organisation into a foundational
structure of the global economic and political architecture.”21
B. Origins and Impetus
Formed in 2001, SCO binds six states – China, Russia, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – in a regional treaty designed to
protect the states’ shared Central Asia borders from extremist, separatist,
and terrorist forces.22 Except for Uzbekistan, each SCO member was
party to the Shanghai Five, which was created in 1996 to resolve border
disputes in the region and inject stability into a post-Cold War power
vacuum. 23 Each of the Shanghai Five, along with Uzbekistan, faced
separatist threats 24 as well as the prospect of American-led NATO
enlargement and intervention in their vicinity.25 These factors led to the
creation of SCO.
C. Imminent Expansion and Its Implications
SCO’s ambitions, which are frequently echoed by officials of SCO
nations,26 are vast but not farfetched. The sheer size of its collective
population, landmass, GDP, political clout, and military power render its
goals at least conceivable, if not likely.
In September 2014, at SCO’s annual summit, members approved
expansion of the organization, with India and Pakistan expected to join in
19
20

UN Charter, art. 38.
SCO Charter art. 1, available at http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69 (emphasis

added).

21
Press Release, The Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin Takes Part in an Expanded Meeting of the SCO Heads of Government
(Nov. 7, 2011), http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/16987/print/.
22
SCO Charter preamble, art. 1, available at http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69
23
Alfred Gerstl, The China Factor in Regional Security Cooperation, 1 AUSTRIAN J. OF
SOUTH-EAST ASIAN STUDIES, 118, 130 (2008).
24
Mark N. Katz, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Moscow’s Lonely Road
from Bishkek to Dushanbe, 32 ASIAN PERSP., 183, 187 (2008).
25
Kajsa Ji Noe Oest & Peter Toft, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization – a Threat or
Opportunity or Europe?, Institut for Statskundskab, Kobenhavns Universitet, 25–26, 33 (2007).
26
See, e.g., Alexander Yakovenko, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Allies of a New
Type, RT.COM (September 12, 2014), http://rt.com/op-edge/187360-sco-economic-humanitariancooperation/ (stating, in the words of the Russian Ambassador to the UK, “SCO has become an
influential organization and an important factor in the emergence of a new polycentric world order”;
Yavokenko served as Deputy Foreign Minister from 2005 to 2011. Id.).
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2015.27 A newly constituted eight-member SCO would represent more
than 40 percent of the world’s population,28 one-quarter of its landmass,29
and nearly 20 percent of global GDP.30 It would also possess two United
Nations Security Council vetoes (Russia and China), four nuclear powers
(Russia, China, India, and Pakistan), and three of the world’s four most
powerful militaries (Russia, China, and India).31
While any number of inter-member conflicts could hinder or derail
the organization,32 such conflicts could be outweighed by a common
commitment to authoritarian principles, 33 the threat of separatist
groups,34 and a collective desire to reduce American and democratic
influences in the world, specifically in Central Asia.35
As Parts I, III, and IV indicate, “the new . . . political and economic
international order”36 that the SCO seeks is authoritarian in nature. Those
sections also illustrate that such a transformation of the current order is
possible because SCO states view their SCO treaty obligations as
paramount. Furthermore, since SCO represents an increasingly large
segment of the international community,37 its doctrines, practices, and

27
Pax Sinica, China is trying to build a new world order, starting in Asia, THE ECONOMIST,
(Sept. 20, 2014), available at http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21618866-china-trying-buildnew-world-order-starting-asia-pax-sinica.
28
Marin Katusa, How Russia and Putin’s Alliances Will Challenge U.S. Hegemony, EQUITIES,
(November
13,
2014,
1:32
PM),
http://www.equities.com/editors-desk/economymarkets/politics/how-russia-and-putins-alliances-will-challenge-us-hegemony.
29
Countries of the World by Area, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE,
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/countries_by_area.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
30
GDP
(current
US$),
THE
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
31
Countries
Ranked
by
Military
Strength
(2014),
GLOBAL FIREPOWER,
http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
32
E.g., border disputes between China and India, geopolitical political rivalries between Russia
and China, conflicts between Pakistan and India, and competition for energy and other resources.
33
As of 2014, SCO is comprised exclusively of authoritarian regimes. Undermining
Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians, FREEDOM HOUSE, June 2009, at 60 available at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/undermining-democracy-21st-centuryauthoritarians#.VQmdBY7WiYl. While India is the world’s largest democracy, it remains to be seen
whether it will have any influence on SCO’s guiding principles once it joins. Arguably, the reverse is
more likely. SCO’s principles have solidified over a decade and SCO expects new members to
conform to these principles. Chinese foreign minister Cheng Guoping stated in May 2012 that states
aspiring to SCO membership “must work hard towards political, legal and technical preparations for
[membership].” Ananth Krishnan, Observer Countries ‘Must Work Hard’ for SCO Membership,
THE HINDU (May 24, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/observer-countriesmust-work-hard-for-sco-membership-says-china/article3450358.ece.
34
Katz, supra note 24.
35
See Expert: Shanghai Group Expands Non-American World, SPUTNIKNEWS.COM (Sept. 10,
2014, 2:12 PM), http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20140910/192803481/Expert-Shanghai-Group-ExpandsNon-American-World.html; see also Andrew Scheineson, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Mar.
24,
2009),
(Backgrounder),
THE
http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883 (stating “SCO members are
uneasy about certain U.S. policies, particularly its support of democratic reforms”).
36
Press Release, supra note 21.
37
In addition to India and Pakistan, current SCO observer states include Afghanistan, Iran, and
Mongolia; dialogue partners include Belarus, Turkey, and Sri Lanka. THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The United States’
2005 application to join SCO as an observer state was rejected. Ariel Cohen, What to Do about the
Shanghai Cooperation Organizations Rising Influence, EURASIANET (Sept. 20, 2006 7:00 PM),
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092106.shtml.
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values also have the potential to alter customary law, which is, after all,
comprised of the general practices that states accept as law.38
Thus, the new authoritarian-friendly39 regime that the SCO envisions
would erode the human rights that states, intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals have
spent decades working to enshrine in international law.
III. THE PROBLEMATIC LEGAL BASIS OF SCO’S CORE DOCTRINES
A. The Broadly Defined “Three Evils”
To understand SCO and its aims, it is necessary to understand the
core doctrine that drives its policies and practices. Known as the “Three
Evils,” this doctrine provides vast leeway for the aggressive prevention
and prosecution of terrorism, separatism, and extremism by SCO’s
member states.
SCO defines each of the “Three Evils” differently than the UN and
other international organizations. Under SCO, separatism is defined to
include violent acts, or the planning or aiding of such acts, which are
intended to violate the territorial integrity of a state. This includes the
annexation of any part of a state’s territory or the disintegration of a
state.40 Extremism is broadly defined to include violent acts intended to
seize, keep power, or change the constitutional regime of a State, “as
well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including
organization, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations and
participation in them.” 41 Terrorism, under the 2009 SCO CounterTerrorism Convention, is vaguely defined as “an ideology of violence
and [the] practice of attempting to influence the decisions of state
authorities or international organisations by committing or threatening to
commit violent or criminal acts intended to intimidate the population and
cause damage to individuals, society and the state.”42
The expansive language of these “definitions” begs further
clarification, but none is provided. Thus, under the SCO regime,
terrorism can be reduced to the mere threat of any criminal act intended
to intimidate and cause some type of damage for the purpose of
attempting to influence a state or international organization.
Although the international community lacks a “universal and
comprehensive” definition of terrorism, a consensus framework
38

Customary Law, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/overview-customarylaw.htm.
39
Authoritarian: 1. Favoring or enforcing strict obedience to authority, especially that of the
government at the expense of personal freedoms. 1.1 Showing a lack of concern for the wishes or
opinions of others; domineering; dictatorial. Authoritarian Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/authoritarian (last visited Nov.
19, 2014).
40
The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism art. 1, para.
2, June 15, 2001.
41
Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
42
The Official Site of the President of Russia, Ratification of SCO Counter-Terrorism
Convention (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.eng.kremlin.ru/news/1055.
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nevertheless exists,43 and it is much stricter than SCO’s. Specifically, it
insists that terrorist offenses should be limited to (a) acts that intend to
cause at least “serious bodily injury, or the taking of hostages” (b) “for
the purpose of provoking a state of terror, intimidating a population, or
compelling a Government or international organization” (c) that fall
within the scope and definition of international agreements pertaining to
terrorism.44 In addition, consensus holds that “[i]t is essential . . . to
ensure that the term ‘terrorism’ is confined in its use to conduct that is
genuinely of a terrorist nature.”45 To that end, “it is important for States
to ensure that [anti-terrorism measures] . . . [are] formulated with
precision.”46
Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 1456 stipulates that “states
must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all
their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures
in accordance with international law, in particular international human
rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”47 According to Article 25 of the
UN Charter, all members “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council.”48
SCO contradicts UN Resolution 1456 by using the “Three Evils”
doctrine to establish policies and take actions that blatantly violate
fundamental and universal human rights. The violated rights include:
humane treatment during deprivation of liberty; fair and public hearings;
adequate time and facilities for preparation of a defense and
communication with counsel; freedom from forced confession of guilt;
appeal of convictions and sentences; freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion; manifestation of religion; holding of opinions without
interference; expression of information and ideas of all kinds through any
media; peaceful assembly; association with others; electoral rights;
freedom from religious discrimination; cultural, religious, and linguistic
rights for minorities; freedom from genocide; freedom from torture;
freedom from refoulement; and self-determination.49 Section IV provides
detailed examples of SCO members’ violations of these rights.
These are not just rights that the international community at large has
deemed important; SCO members have legally bound themselves to
protect and uphold these rights. These rights are contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
43

Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, para. 33,
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98 (Dec. 28, 2005) (by Martin Scheinin)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report]; see also S.C. Res. 1566, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566
(Oct. 8, 2004).
44
Id. at para. 50.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
S.C. Res. 1456, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (italics added).
48
U.N. Charter art. 25.
49
See, respectively, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 10, 14.1, 14.3(b),
14.3(g), 14.5, 18.1, 18.3, 19.1, 19.2, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Convention against Torture,
supra note 6, arts. 2, 3; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
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Convention on Genocide, the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), all of which are legally binding50 and which reiterate many of
the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.51
Each SCO member has signed and ratified these treaties, with one
exception: China signed the ICCPR in 1998, but has yet to ratify it.52
However, since China has acceded to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, it is still prohibited from acting in a way that would “defeat
the object and purpose” of any treaty it has signed. 53
To be fair, under the ICCPR and ICESCR, states can restrict freedom
of movement and freedom of expression, but only when necessary for the
protection of national security or public order.54 However, prohibitions
on genocide, torture, and refoulement are so widespread, settled, and
fundamental in international law as to constitute or border on jus cogens,
which cannot be overridden by any exigency.55
Thus, the “Three Evils” doctrine poses serious legal difficulties for
SCO members in light of their human rights treaty obligations. In
particular, by stretching the consensus definition of terrorism beyond its
breaking point, this doctrine allows SCO members to target even
peaceful dissidents and run roughshod over their fundamental rights.
This, however, is not unintentional but rather wholly congruent with
SCO’s stated aim to usher in a new international order, one in which it
sees itself as the “pioneer organization” dealing with international
terrorism.56
B. Reciprocal Recognition under the “Concept of Cooperation”
Compounding the problems of the “Three Evils” doctrine, SCO
states agreed in 2005 to the “Concept of Cooperation,” which provides
that member states will harmonize domestic legislation to ensure
“reciprocal recognition of a terrorist, separatist, or extremist act
regardless of whether legislation of SCO member states includes a
corresponding act in the same category of crimes or whether the act is

50

Frequently Asked Questions regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS ENABLE, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/convinfofaq.htm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2014).
51
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
52
ICCPR, supra note 49. The ICCPR was ratified by Russia (1973), Uzbekistan (1995),
Kyrgyzstan (1994), Tajikistan (1999), and Kazakhstan (2006); China signed in 1998. Id.
53
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. China
ratified on Sept. 3, 1997. Id.
54
ICCPR, supra note 49, at arts. 8(c), 12.3, 13, 19.3(b), 21, 22.2. Each of these allows for
restrictions when necessary to protect national security or public order; however, 8(c), 21, and 22.2
allow restrictions only in “democratic societ[ies].” Id.
55
Jus
Cogens
Definition,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jus_cogens (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
56
History of Development of SCO, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2006 3:16 PM), available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020347.htm.

169

SUMMER 2015

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

described using the very same terms.”57 Stated simply, the law of one
member becomes the law of all members. Thus, an individual deemed a
“Three Evils” suspect by China must be considered such by Tajikistan.
A specific provision of the “Concept of Cooperation” provides one
illustration of how the concept works. This provision declares that
member states will “not provide asylum for individuals, accused or
suspected of conducting terrorism, separatist, and extremist activity, and
[will] extradite such individuals at respective requests on the part of
another SCO member state.”58 Such reciprocity enables the prosecution
and punishment of a vast array of dissent. For example, Tibetan monks
who flee to India59 after being caught planning a self-immolation protest,
could be extradited to China as terrorists under the extradition provision
of the 2005 Declaration and under SCO’s definition of terrorism.60 Or,
suppose that Karakalpak students peacefully demonstrate for expanded
labor rights and then clash with Uzbek police following the police’s
detonation of teargas. Under the “Concept of Cooperation,” those
students could be prosecuted as extremists using Russia’s expansive antiextremism laws.
Russia’s definition of extremism is particularly troublesome because
it provides a list of twelve general activities rather than a clear, precise
statement of characteristics. 61 Included among these is the nebulous
“stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord.”62 Under Section
280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code, anyone who publicly calls for
“extremist activity” can be imprisoned for up to three years.63 Using
mass media to do so can increase the term to five years.64 Involvement in
the activity of a public or religious association that has been deemed
“extremist” by a court warrants imprisonment of two years.65 Particularly
powerful is Article 282, which allows authorities to imprison anyone
who publicly attempts to incite hatred or enmity or disparagement of a
person.66
Under SCO’s “Concept of Cooperation,” members must harmonize
their domestic legislation regimes to ensure “reciprocal recognition” of
57
Concept of Cooperation Between SCO Member States in Combating Terrorism, Separatism,
and
Extremism,
art.
3
June
5,
2005,
available
at
http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Reports/SCO/2011-HRIC-SCO-Whitepaper-AppendixASCO-Docs.pdf.
58
Declaration of Heads of Member States of SCO, CHINA DAILY (June 12, 2006 3:15 PM),
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/12/content_6020345.htm.
59
That is, once India joins SCO, an event which is expected to take place in 2015. Pax Sinica,
supra note 27.
60
See Li Decheng, Self-immolations Are Not Noble Behavior, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 30, 2011, at
8 (“Those that encourage monks and nuns to commit self-immolation are engaged in religious
extremism and terrorism.”); see also Hua Zi, Extreme Acts of Violence, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 25,
2011, at 8 (stating it is “terrorist behavior . . . to incite young Tibetans to commit suicide”).
61
EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, FEDERAL LAW ON COMBATING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 7
(2012) (unofficial translation provided by the Council of Europe) (reflecting amendments made in
2008).
62
Id.
63
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation art. 280.1, available at
http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/7.
64
Id. at art. 280(2).
65
Id. at art. 282.2(2).
66
Id. at art. 282(1).
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other members’ characterizations of “Three Evils” acts even if their
criminal codes do not include those acts or address them the same way.
Thus, Russia’s formulation of “extremism” carries great import and,
unsurprisingly, prompted the following statement by the UN Human
Rights Committee in a 2009 report:
[E]xtremism laws are being used to target organizations
and individuals critical of the Government . . . . [T]he
definition of ‘extremist activity’ in the [Russian] Federal
Law on Combating Extremist Activity remains vague,
allowing for arbitrariness in its application . . . . [T]he
2006 amendment to this law has made certain forms of
defamation of public officials an act of extremism.67
The “Concept of Cooperation” also seriously compromises SCO
members’ obligations under international law to refrain from refoulement
and to respect individuals’ freedom of movement.68 With the exception
of Uzbekistan, every SCO member has ratified the legally binding
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR).69 Article 33 of
CRSR expressly prohibits refoulement: “No Contracting State shall expel
or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.”70
In addition, every SCO member has ratified the Convention against
Torture, Article 2 of which states: “Each State Party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” Article 3 states: “No State
Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.” Furthermore, Article 16 prohibits
“acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 71 Thus,
the “Concept of Cooperation” poses problems for SCO members, given
their legal obligation to each of these treaties.
C. Secretive Blacklist Formulation and Opaque Information-Sharing
Practices
SCO’s lack of transparency makes it impossible to know whom it
suspects of “Three Evils” activities and how such determinations are
made. This is particularly troubling given the size of SCO’s blacklist. In
2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human
67
Human Rights Committee, Considerations Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of
the Covenant, para. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 (Nov. 24, 2009).
68
Convention against Torture, supra note 49, at art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 49, at art. 12;
Refugee Convention, supra note 6.
69
The Refugee Convention has been ratified by China (1982), Kazakhstan (1989), Kyrgyzstan
(1996), Russia (1993), and Tajikistan (1993). Id.
70
Id.
71
Convention against Torture, supra note 49, at art. 2, 3, 16.
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Rights, Martin Scheinin, stated that SCO’s terrorist blacklist, which is
known to contain 1100 names, is twice the length of the UN’s terrorist
list.72
The SCO entity responsible for gathering and sharing information on
“Three Evils” suspects is called the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
(RATS). According to its executive director, RATS goes to whatever
lengths necessary to gather information about organizations and
individuals suspected of “Three Evils” activities.73 Such information is
posted to a secret blacklist website. 74 RATS’ secrecy and lack of
oversight and accountability create what Scheinin has called “an
insurmountable wall against independent investigations into human
rights violations.”75
Under the legal framework of RATS, SCO states possess power to
dispatch their agents to pursue suspects in consenting member states.76
Furthermore, the secret service agency of any SCO state can request
assistance from any other state’s secret services in gathering information
and pursuing suspects. 77 The requesting state need only provide the
purpose of and the grounds for the request, as well as the type of
assistance desired (e.g. interrogation, detention, or extradition). 78 The
responding state must then “take all necessary measures to ensure a
prompt and complete execution of the request.” 79 The “means and
supporting materials used” to fulfill the request “shall not be subject to
disclosure.”80
The opacity of this process has major ramifications for the due
process of law. Simply put, the state receiving a request has no means to
verify the quality, or even existence, of the evidence used by the
requesting state to pursue a suspect. Likewise, the requesting state never
knows the means used to fulfill its request.
As a result, and as illustrated via case studies in Part IV, the opacity
of the RATS framework threatens fundamental and universal human
rights, including: freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention;
compensation for unlawful arrest; the presumption of innocence for those
charged with crimes; freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference
with one’s privacy, family or unlawful attacks on one’s honor or
reputation; freedom of association with others; prompt and detailed
72
Human Rights in the North Caucasus: Hearing before the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission, 115th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Martin Scheinin, U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Counterterrorism
and
Human
Rights),
available
at
http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/2011-hric-sco-whitepaper-full.pdf.
73
SCO Anti-terror Agency Successful: Official, CHINA DAILY (June 13, 2006, 8:57 PM),
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/13/eng20060613_273727.html.
74
Id.
75
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 49, Human
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/3 (Feb. 4, 2009).
76
The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization art. 18,
June 16, 2009.
77
Id.
78
Id. at art. 14.
79
Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, supra note 40,
art. 9.1 (2001).
80
Id. at art. 11.4.
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information about the nature and cause of the charges against oneself;
and an effective remedy for violated rights.81 All of these rights are
contained in the legally binding International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Thus, the secret and opaque nature of RATS’
blacklist and information-sharing practices bodes ill for fundamental
human rights related to the due process of law.
D. Adherence to the Principle of “Non-interference in Internal Affairs”
The SCO Charter seeks to insulate members from human rights
criticisms by stressing the principle of “non-interference in internal
affairs.” 82 Explication of this core principle is found in the 2006
Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, which states:
Diversity of civilization and model of development must
be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural
traditions, political and social systems, values and model
of development formed in the course of history should
not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries’
internal affairs. Model of social development should not
be “exported.”83
However, this declaration runs counter to expert opinion. In 2010, a
group of UN human rights experts issued the following statement:
No one may invoke cultural diversity as an excuse to
infringe on human rights guaranteed by international law
or limit their scope, nor should cultural diversity be
taken to support segregation and harmful traditional
practices which, in the name of culture, seek to sanctify
differences that run counter to the universality,
indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.
....
We remind States of their responsibility under
international law to create an environment conducive to
cultural diversity and the enjoyment of cultural rights in
which all persons, including national or ethnic, religious
and linguistic minorities . . . have the right: to express

81

ICCPR, supra note 49, at arts. 2.3(a), 9.1, 9.5, 14.3(a), 14.2, 17.1, and 22.1.
Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization art. 2, May 7, 2009, available at
http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=69.
83
Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of SCO art. 3, CHINA DAILY, (June 15, 2006, 8:30
PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/15/content_618177.htm.
82
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themselves . . . [and] participate in the cultural life of
their choice.84
While SCO’s core principle of “non-interference in internal affairs”
is well supported by the fundamental international law of sovereign
equality, upon which the UN is based,85 sovereign equality is itself based
on the universal right to self-determination. That is, before a nation can
exist, with all of its guarantees of sovereignty and equality within the
community of nations, it is first a people—a people with an absolute
right to self-determination, which is to say the right to be free from
oppression and to pursue their own development, even to build their own
nation if such development is denied by their current government.
Thus, international law holds that a sovereign state that represents all
of its peoples “on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and
respects the principles of self-determination in its own internal
arrangements, is entitled to the protection of international law of its
territorial integrity.” 86 Conversely, a state that denies internal people(s)87
“meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic,
cultural and social development” forfeits its sovereign authority. 88
The universal right to self-determination is so well established in
international law it “has acquired a status beyond ‘convention’ and is
considered a general principle of international law.” 89 It appears in
Article 1 of the UN Charter,90 Article 1 of the ICESCR, and Article 1 of
ICCPR, the latter two of which read: “All peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”91 Every SCO state is party to each of these covenants.
Certainly not every separatist movement possesses a lawful claim to
self-determination. However, SCO’s doctrines enable its members to
engage in practices that deny internal minorities their basic human right
to “meaningful access to government to pursue political, economic,
culture and social development.”92
84
Statement by a Group of United Nations Experts on the World Day for Cultural Diversity for
Dialogue and Development, “Human Rights are Essential Tools for an Effective Intercultural
Dialogue,”
May
21,
2010,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/cultural_rights/docs/statements/Statement_cultural_diversity2
1052010.doc.
85
U.N. Charter art. 2.1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members.”).
86
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), paras. 128, 154.
87
A definition of a minority people provided by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities includes “a group
numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose
members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity,
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” Minorities under
International Law, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
88
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 86, at para. 138.
89
Id. at para. 114.
90
U.N. Charter art. 1.2.
91
ICESCR, supra note 49, art 1; ICCPR, supra note 49, art 1.
92
Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 86.
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The 2014 Freedom in the World report, published by the nongovernmental organization Freedom House, provides some perspective
on the degree of self-determination possible for peoples within SCO
countries. SCO country scores are listed in the following table (1 = best
score possible; 7 = worst score possible):93
Political Rights94
China
7
6
Kazakhstan98
99
5
Kyrgyzstan
6
Russia100
6
Tajikistan101
7
Uzbekistan102
97

Civil Liberties95
6.5
5
5
5
6
7

Status96
Not Free
Not Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Not Free
Not Free

This table is meant to provide only a quantitative snapshot. Detailed,
documented reports analyzing each SCO member’s performance on
human rights can be found at the U.S. Department of State website
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013.103
Thus, SCO invokes the principle of “non-interference in internal
affairs” to deflect international criticism of SCO members’ practices that
violate internal minorities’ rights to self-determination. Part IV(B) below
presents a case study that specifically illustrates the conflict between the
SCO doctrines and an internal people’s right to self-determination.

93
See
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
Methodology,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology#.VGh4q2x0yM9
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2015) (explaining that the scores are based on analysis of more than 140 different
questions).
94
Id. (explaining that the “Political Rights” score is comprised of analysis of the country’s
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning government).
95
Id. (explaining that the “Civil Liberties” score is comprised of analysis of the country’s
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
autonomy and individual rights).
96
Id. (explaining that the “Status” rating is an average of the “Political Rights” and “Civil
Liberties” scores, wherein 5.5 to 7.0 = Not Free; 3.0 to 5.0 = Partly Free; and 1.0 to 2.5 = Free).
97
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
China,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/china-0#.VGh40Gx0yM8 (last visited Mar. 6,
2015).
98
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
Kazakhstan,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/kazakhstan-0#.VGh5wGx0yM8 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2015).
99
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
Kyrgyzstan,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/kyrgyzstan-0#.VGh51Gx0yM8 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2015).
100
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
Russia,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/russia-0#.VGh6OWx0yM8 (last visited Mar. 6,
2015).
101
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
Tajikistan,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/tajikistan-0#.VGh4omx0yM9 (last visited Mar.
6, 2015).
102
Freedom
in
the
World
2014
Uzbekistan,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/uzbekistan-0#.VGh54Gx0yM8 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2015).
103
See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, STATE.GOV,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (last visited Jun. 10,
2015).
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IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SCO OBLIGATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS: THREE CASE STUDIES
The case studies in this Part and in Part I of this Comment were
chosen because, collectively, they involve each SCO state and each core
SCO doctrine discussed in Part III. Moreover, collectively, they elucidate
the conflict between SCO’s core doctrines and SCO members’ binding
obligations to fundamental international laws.
A. Russia’s Illegal Extradition of Makhmadruzi Iskandarov to Tajikistan
In October 2005, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan sentenced
Makhmadruzi Iskandarov, head of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(DPT), to twenty-three years in prison.104 Iskandarov had left Tajikistan
eighteen months prior and established residence in Russia. 105 After
Iskandarov left, Tajik authorities sought to tie him to an illegal armed
organization, issued a warrant for his arrest, and aggressively pressed
Russian authorities for his extradition.106 Accusations against him ranged
from terrorism, attempted murder, and illegal arms possession, to abuse
of office and theft of state funds.107 Iskandarov, a former state utility
executive who planned to run for president in 2005, was highly critical of
President Rakhmonov, who has ruled Tajikistan continuously since 1994.
Iskandarov’s DPT had called for free and transparent elections.108
In response to Tajikistan’s request, Russian authorities detained
Iskandarov in December 2004, but released him after claiming
insufficient evidence for extradition.109 They detained him again in April
2005 after intense lobbying from Tajik authorities, who wanted to charge
him with attempting a coup d’état. 110 Again, however, Russian
authorities claimed insufficient evidence for extradition and freed him in
Moscow.111
Importantly, Iskandarov had appealed to Russian authorities for
refugee status. 112 Russia (as well as Tajikistan) is party to the UN
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,113 which prohibits the
return of “a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
104
Tajik Court Sentences Iskandarov to 23 Years, MOSCOW TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005, 12:00 AM),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/paid/2005/10/article/tajik-court-sentences-iskandarov-to23-years/209458.html.
105
Tajik Democratic Party Leader-Terrorist or Simple Criminal, SPUTNIK NEWS (Nov. 12,
2004, 6:46 PM), http://en.ria.ru/onlinenews/20041211/39775461.html?id.
106
Id.
107
Tajik Court Sentences Iskandarov to 23 Years, supra note 104.
108
Tajik Democratic Party Leader-Terrorist or Simple Criminal, supra note 105.
109
‘Missing’ Tajik Opposition Leader Reportedly Arrested, RADIO FREE EUROPE (April 26,
2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058646.html.
110
Arkady Dubnov, Tajik Opposition Leader Makhmadruzi Iskandarov Became a Political
NEWS
(April
14,
2005,
3:14
PM),
Refugee
in
Russia,
FERGHANA
http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=911.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Refugee Convention, supra note 6. See also Danielle J. Grigsby, The Silent Plague:
Refoulement in the Russian Federation, 1 OXFORD MONITOR OF FORCED MIGRATION 33,
http://oxmofm.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/OxMo-vol-1-no-2-07-GRIGSBY.pdf.
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his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.”114 Upon Iskandarov’s release in Moscow, Russia’s
Directorate of Information Vasily Glushenko stated, “No person
applying for the status of a refugee can be extradited from Russia before
the decision on the appeal is made.”115 The next day, however, a group of
men seized Iskandarov in Moscow without presenting identification, an
arrest warrant, or a judicial order of any kind.116 They spirited him to a
bathhouse where he was beaten,117 and though he requested a lawyer, his
request was denied.118 The next day he was taken to a forest where his
face was covered with a mask, and the following morning he was flown
to Tajikistan where he was placed in a Dushanbe prison to await his
trial.119 While in prison, Iskandarov suffered abuse and had only limited
access to his family and lawyers.120
In July 2005, three months before Iskandarov’s trial, SCO leaders
gathered in Astana to sign the Declaration of the Heads of Members
States of the SCO.121 According to this agreement, SCO member states
will “not provide asylum for individuals, accused or suspected of
conducting terrorism, separatist, and extremist activity, and [will]
extradite such individuals at respective requests on the part of another
SCO member state.”122
Thus, this agreement does not require evidence of terrorist,
separatist, or extremist activity—only an accusation of such—for
extradition to take place. Nor does it require the extraditing state to
consider whether the suspect might be tortured upon return to the
requesting state. Thus, this SCO agreement conflicts with Article 3 of the
UN Convention against Torture, which both Russia and Tajikistan have
ratified. Article 3 prohibits the extradition of an individual “where there
are substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”123
Iskandarov stated that he was indeed tortured, as well as drugged and
subjected to electric shocks after refoulement to Dushanbe.124 Following
Iskandarov’s trial, Tajik officials allegedly denied him access to his
family and lawyers for at least eight months, and he remained in the pretrial detention facility instead of a prison camp until February 2007,
about three months after President Rakhmonov’s reelection. 125
Incidentally, Rakhmonov won more than seventy-nine percent of the

114

Refugee Convention, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
Dubnov, supra note 110.
116
Iskandarov v. Tajikistan, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 39/2006,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4/Add.1 at 18 (2007).
117
Iskandarov v. Russia, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 28 (2010).
118
Id.
119
Id. at paras. 30, 33.
120
U.S. ‘Concerned’ over Tajik Opposition Leader’s Jailing, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Oct. 7,
2005), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061960.html.
121
Declaration of Heads of Member States of SCO, supra note 58.
122
Id. at para. 3.
123
Convention against Torture, supra note 6.
124
Iskandarov, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 92. See also id. at paras. 88, 89, 94.
125
Id. at paras. 88, 90, 92; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: TAJIKISTAN (2007).
115
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vote.126 OSCE, which was invited to observe the process, reported that
the election lacked “a genuine choice and meaningful pluralism, and
revealed substantial shortcomings,” including the absence of “a
framework for democratic elections,” widespread multiple voting, and a
failure to follow counting procedures.127
The European Court of Human Rights unanimously ruled in 2010
that Russia’s abduction and unacknowledged detention of Iskandarov
“constituted a complete negation of the right to liberty and security of
person,” in violation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, to which Russia is party.128 It also unanimously concluded that
Russia’s failure “to protect him against risks of ill-treatment” violated
Article 3, which states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 129 The court cited
reports indicating that torture of detainees by Tajik authorities was
common and, thus, foreseeable.130
Thus, while Russia’s refoulement of Iskandarov to Tajikistan
flagrantly violated the European Convention on Human Rights, the U.N.
Convention against Torture, and the UN Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees, it fully comports with SCO’s “Concept of
Cooperation,” as outlined above in Part III(B), which requires the ondemand extradition of anyone even suspected of the “Three Evils.”
B. Chinese National Security Interests vs. Uyghurs’ Right to SelfDetermination
On July 5, 2009, hundreds of ethnic Uyghurs took to the streets of
Urumqi, the capital of and largest city in Xinjiang, China’s western-most
province. 131 Their peaceful protest of Chinese officials’ failure to
investigate the deaths of migrant Uyghurs in a factory fight in
Guangdong the prior month turned into a clash with ethnic Han and
further escalated as Chinese police confronted demonstrators with tear
gas.132 The conflict injured 1,700 and left 200 dead, including three Han
and one police officer.133

126
Tajik President Wins Third Term, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2006, 3:59 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6119752.stm.
127
OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (OSCE), ORGANIZATION
FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, PRELIMINARY, REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 6 NOVEMBER 2006 1, 2, 8–9 (Apr. 18, 2007).
128
Iskandarov, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 150.
129
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3,
Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
130
Iskandarov, App. No. 17185/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 87–88, 92.
131
Edward Wong, Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at
A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html?_r=0.
132
Edward Wong, China Locks Down Restive Region after Deadly Clashes, N.Y. TIMES, July
7,
2009,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/world/asia/07china.html?pagewanted=all.
133
Feature: Urumqi Licks Its Wounds on Riot Anniversary, PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 5, 2014,
3:22 PM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0705/c90882-8751421.html; Wong, supra note
131.
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Uyghurs, who are mostly Muslim and speak Turkish, make up fortysix percent of Xinjiang’s twenty-two million people.134 However, they
comprise just thirteen percent of Urumqi’s 2.4 million people, and less
than one percent of China’s total citizenry; though, at ten million, they
exceed the population of many countries, e.g., Tajikistan and Austria.135
Han Chinese, on the other hand, constitute ninety-two percent of China’s
population, including thirty-nine percent of Xinjiang and seventy-three
percent of the city of Urumqi.136
Uyghurs consistently invoke the universal right to selfdetermination, as well as the freedom of religion, freedom of expression,
and freedom from discrimination to justify their protests of Chinese
oppression.137 SCO and China, on the other hand, cite the “Three Evils”
doctrine and the principle of “Non-interference in Internal Affairs” to
justify the oppressive measures employed by Chinese authorities. 138
Disturbingly, they make little attempt to distinguish between violent and
peaceful dissidents.139
The riots in Urumqi illustrate Uyghur desperation born of longstanding and increasing Chinese repression. The territory of Xinjiang,
which literally means “new borders” in Chinese, was officially annexed
as a province by the Qing dynasty in the late nineteenth century.140 In
their 1931 draft constitution, Chinese Communist leaders promised the
Uyghurs independence,141 and even up until the end of World War II

134
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2013,
POPULATION
AT
YEAR-END
BY
REGION
(2013),
available
at
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/html/Z0305E.xls. In 1945, Xinjiang was 83% Uyghur and just
6.2% Han. By 1982, it was 46% Uyghur and 40% Han, roughly the same as today. Anthony Howell
& C. Cindy Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in
Urumqi, 52 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 119, 123 (2011).
135
Countries in the World (ranked by 2014 population), WORLDOMETERS,
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
136
Howell & Fan, supra note 134 at 125; Ethnic Groups (All of China), THE AMERICAN
FORUM FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION, http://www.globaled.org/curriculum/china/ethnic.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2014); Lisa Chiu, Introduction to the Uyghur People, ABOUT NEWS,
http://chineseculture.about.com/od/minoritiesinchina/a/Uyghurs.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
137
See Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur
Discontent, 11 POLICY STUDIES, 1, 12, 35, 48 (2004); Parameswaran Ponnudurai, Uyghurs Push for
FREE
ASIA
(May
10,
2011),
Self-Determination,
RADIO
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghurs-05102011012120.html;
Uyghurs
Stage
International Demonstrations over Human Rights Abuses, WORLD UYGHUR CONGRESS (Oct. 1,
2014), http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=23540.
138
A week after the violent crackdown in Urumqi, the SCO Secretary-General invoked the
principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” in an official statement, part of which read, “SCO
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Mao still favored self-determination.142 By 1947, however, that policy
had changed to “national regional autonomy.”143
Today, Xinjiang, which is China’s largest province in terms of both
landmass and oil and gas reserves, is too valuable to part with.144 As a
result, Uyghurs have no political voice in Xinjiang’s future, and though
they enjoy a plurality of its population, they possess relatively scant
representation in positions of industry and government, which are
dominated by Han Chinese.145
In addition to a lack of meaningful access to government, Uyghurs
are subject to religiously, linguistically, culturally, and ethnically dilutive
policies that collectively constitute not only discrimination but, arguably,
constructive genocide. The legal definition of genocide includes the
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group . . . [by] deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part;
[or] imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.”146
The following are only a few examples of Chinese attempts to do exactly
that.
In September 2014, Chinese officials in Urumqi began offering
rewards “to people who report the illegal production and sale of facecovering gowns and clothing that represent religious extremism.”147
In May 2014, following some sixty years of large-scale migration of
Han Chinese into Xinjiang,148 Chinese president Xi Jinping called for the
relocation of Uyghurs to other parts of China for education and work,
emphasizing the need for Chinese ethnic minorities to develop “correct
views about the motherland,” and its greatness.149 At the same time, Xi
pushed for intensified Mandarin education for Turkish-speaking
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Uyghurs, 150 and the bestowal of cash, health care, and educational
benefits on Han Chinese who intermarry with Uyghurs.151
In addition, China has stepped up its “Strike Hard” campaign, which
relies on the “Three Evils” doctrine, employing closed-circuit cameras,
regular identification checks, and even examinations of cellphone
playlists to ferret out Uyghur extremists and terrorists. 152 China has
encouraged fellow SCO members to follow suit.153
In August 2014, the Xinjiang city of Karamay banned those wearing
long beards, headscarves, veils, jilbabs, or clothing with Muslim symbols
from using public transportation.154 In November, officials in Urumqi
arrested several people for “illegal preaching” and other activities under
religious extremism laws. 155 Kashgar’s mayor applauded the prison
sentences, which ranged from five to sixteen years, saying religious
extremism had “seriously affected people’s thoughts.”156 Furthermore,
during Ramadan, Chinese authorities forbid Muslim civil servants from
fasting. 157 The list goes on. Such a patent denial of internal selfdetermination lends legal credence to Uyghur calls for independence.
Unsurprisingly, the Uyghur population has resisted these measures.
At the end of Ramadan, the government-appointed imam of China’s
largest mosque was stabbed to death. 158 Uyghur terrorism against
symbols of government has escalated in parallel with China’s “Strike
Hard” campaign. Such terrorist acts include an attack on a Xinjiang
police station,159 bomb and knife attacks at the Urumqi train station,160
the stabbing to death of twenty-nine people by masked, knife-wielding
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assailants at the Kunming train station,161 and the bombing of a morning
market in Urumqi.162 Again, the list goes on.
It may be difficult to say whether the current Chinese oppression is
the chicken or the egg. Regardless, such oppression does appear to
galvanize the Uyghurs’ separatist movement.163 And, without a vote and
without the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly,
religion, movement, privacy, as well as freedoms from ethnic
discrimination and genocide, they have little left to lose.
C. Kazakhstan’s Refoulement of Ershidin Israil
In late September of 2009 Ershidin Israil, a 38-year-old geography
teacher traveled four nights on foot to escape from his native Chinese
province of Xinjiang to Almaty, Kazakhstan.164 Days earlier, he and two
other men had given an interview to Radio Free Asia about the Chinese
government’s crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs following the July protests
in Urumqi.165 Specifically, Israil had divulged details of the September
18 torture death of Shohret Tursun at the hands of Chinese authorities,
who had been holding the young ethnic Uyghur and some forty other
men since the July riots.166
The day after the interview, Chinese authorities detained the other
two men on suspicion of “leaking state secrets,” and sought to arrest
Israil as well.167 Israil, who years earlier served a six-year sentence for
“acts of separatism,” fled, fearing severe punishment.168
Once in Kazakhstan, Israil applied for asylum with Kazakh
authorities and for refugee status with the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR).169 In March 2010, UNHCR granted his request and
161
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secured a resettlement offer from Sweden.170 Days before Israil’s April 1
departure date, however, Kazakh authorities received an extradition
request from China on grounds of terrorism.171 Kazakhstan denied Israil
an exit visa, citing his appearance on an Interpol terrorism watch list,
which had been arranged by China.172,173
On April 3, Kazakh authorities moved Israil into a “safe place.”174
Less than three months later they arrested him on terrorism charges, and
over the next eleven months Kazakh courts denied his application for
asylum five times.175 On May 3, 2011, UNHCR revoked his refugee
status, and on May 30, 2011, Israil was forcibly extradited to China as a
“major terrorist suspect.”176
The UNHCR refused to disclose its reasons for revoking Israil’s
refugee status, citing confidentiality. However, the World Uyghur
Congress received information from a UNHCR contact who stated that
Kazakh authorities had informed the UNHCR that Israil had been sent by
Chinese authorities to spy on Almaty’s Uyghur population, which
numbers nearly a quarter-of-a-million.177 To date, Israil’s whereabouts
are unknown. China’s last statement came in October 2011 in response to
an inquiry from the Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights. 178 It stated that Israil “was extradited to China in strict
observance by both parties of the extradition treaty between China and
Kazakhstan. Mr. Ershidin has now fully confessed to having carried out
violent illegal terrorist activities and his case is currently being further

170

Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
Hannah
Beech, China’s
Uyghur
Problem, Time (July
28,
2011),
http://world.time.com/2011/07/28/chinas-Uyghur-problem-one-mans-ordeal-echoes-the-plight-of-apeople/.
173
In a somewhat analogous episode, Russia placed Ukrainian politician and activist Dmitry
Yarosh on Interpol’s wanted list in July 2014 for “public incitement to terrorist and extremist
activities involving the use of mass media.” Interpol Puts Ukrainian Ultranationalist Yarosh on
Wanted List, RT (July 25, 2014 12:42 PM), http://rt.com/news/175564-ukraine-interpol-wantedyarosh/.
174
Special Rapporteur Summary, supra at 169.
175
Press Release, Amnesty International USA, Urgent Action UA 173/11, (June 17,
2011), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/uaa17311.pdf.
176
Id. Beech, supra note 172.
177
Hoshur, supra note 166. Israil’s brother, Enver, who later relocated to Kazakhstan, learned
from Kazakh authorities that they had received a picture of Israil from Chinese authorities in
connection with the extradition request. Id. The photo showed Israil with a long beard and was said
to have been taken at the time of Israil’s 1999 trial for “acts of separatism.” Id. Enver said his
brother had never worn a beard and that Chinese defendants are prohibited from wearing a beard at
their trial. Id. Another purportedly fabricated court document used to brand Israil with terrorism
implicated him with alleged terrorist Repket Abdukerim. Id. However, Abdukerim is not known to
been involved with any pro-Uyghur activities or organizations. Id. China claimed Abdukerim trained
in Afghanistan as a member of the Taliban, but did not know his whereabouts. Id. Radio Free Asia,
however, was able to locate Abdukerim, who now works in Turkey. Id. In an interview, Abdukerim
said he knew Israil because they grew up in the same town, but that he “was just a schoolteacher.”
Id. He denied he had ever been to Afghanistan. His relatives said he had worked in business and for
the Chinese government, but left Xinjiang in 2006. Id. According to Enver Israil, Abdukerim was
wanted by Chinese authorities but was fortunate enough to reach Turkey on a business visa. Id.
178
The Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at
Geneva, Letter GJ/42/2011 dated Oct. 11, 2011 addressed to the Office of High Commissioner for
Human
Rights,
U.N.
Doc.
HRC/NONE/2011/174,
available
at
https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/19th/China_11.10.11_%2816.2011%29_translation.pdf.
171
172

183

SUMMER 2015

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

adjudicated.”179, 180 Article 113 of the Chinese Criminal Code stipulates
that crimes that endanger national security are punishable by death.181
Shortly after Israil’s extradition, Kazakhstan extradited 28 Muslim
men to Uzbekistan, which the men had left more than a year before due
to religious persecution.182 Their extraditions, along with Israil’s, took
place just days before Kazakhstan hosted the SCO’s ten-year “Jubilee
Summit” in Astana.183
The pressured extradition of those fleeing religious persecution is not
simply an unhappy side effect of SCO policies; it is an integral part of
the organization’s “Concept of Cooperation.”
Kazakhstan’s extraditions in the run-up to the SCO summit
demonstrate SCO members’ intent to transform the international order
via SCO policies and principles. At the summit, the organization released
a declaration that stated as much, reading in part: “The member states
underline . . . the aim of formulating a comprehensive approach to the
issue of reforming the U.N. and its Security Council . . . .”184
The extraditions even violated Kazakhstan’s own law, which had
been amended just six months earlier to read: “Extradition is not allowed
. . . [if] there is a reason to believe that a person may be subjected to
torture in the requesting state.”185 Such wording mirrors Article 3 of the
Convention against Torture, which Kazakhstan ratified in 1998.186
Two weeks after Kazakhstan’s extradition of Israil to China, the
China Development Bank agreed to extend a $1.5 billion loan to Kazak
mining behemoth Kazkhmys. 187 The timing of the two events was
perhaps more than coincidental. China wanted Israil, and Kazakhstan
wanted the loan. China is Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner,188 and the
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Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline carries up to twenty million metric tons
per year.189
This case typifies the way in which the application of the “Three
Evils” and the “Concept of Cooperation” can lead to violations of
fundamental human rights that SCO members have previously endorsed
via ratification of legally binding conventions. Such rights, which are
addressed in Part III of this Comment, include: association with others;
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the holding of opinions
without interference; expression of information and ideas of all kinds
through any media; freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with
one’s privacy and family; the presumption of innocence for those
charged with crimes; non-refoulement; a fair and public hearing;
adequate time and facilities for preparation of defense and
communication with counsel; freedom from forced confession of guilt;
appeal of convictions and sentences; and effective remedy for violated
rights.
V. CONCLUSION
All too often, the ratification of human rights treaties is an easy
choice for authoritarian regimes. For one thing, it yields praise and
reduces pressure from other states and organizations. For another, failure
to comply with such treaties, even those concerning the most
fundamental of human rights, seldom results in penalties.190 Given this, it
is no surprise that the ratification of human rights treaties by repressive
regimes “is associated with a worsening of human rights.”191
This evidence, along with the proliferation of terrorism and national
security concerns, highlights the increasingly precarious position of
human rights within the international legal system. Now more than ever,
the formulation and execution of security policies requires careful
consideration of human rights. Yet, SCO’s “Three Evils” doctrine,
“Concept of Cooperation,” secret blacklist and information-sharing
practices, and adherence to the principle of “non-interference in internal
affairs” subvert, and even supplant, human rights conventions, customary
law, general principles, and expert opinions which have taken hold as
international law only through many painful lessons and decades of hard
work.
Thus, SCO’s expanding membership portends a transformation of
the international legal system from one in which universal human rights
play a fundamental, guiding role to one in which authoritarianism is the
controlling principle.
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